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The Basic Law, Universal Suffrage and
the Rule of Law in Hong Kong
BY MICHAEL C. DAVIS*

In the past year, Hong Kong has experienced intense public
debate over fulfillment of the commitment in the Hong Kong Basic
Law to implement universal suffrage.' The June 2014 Beijing White
Paper 2 on the "one country, two systems" policy applied in Hong
Kong and the August 31, 2014, National People's Congress (NPC)
Standing Committee Decision 3 on universal suffrage reflect an
abandonment of key commitments in both the Sino-British Joint

* Michael C. Davis, a professor in the Law Faculty at the University of Hong Kong,
has held visiting chairs at Northwestern University Law School (2005-06) and Notre
Dame Law School (2004-05), as well as the Schell Senior Fellowship at the Yale Law
School (1994-95). His publications include Constitutional Confrontation in Hong
Kong (1990), Human Rights and Chinese Values (1995) and International
Intervention: From Power Politics to Global Responsibility (2004), as well as
numerous articles in leading academic journals in law and public affairs. He has law
degrees from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law (3D) and Yale
Law School (LL. M). Professor Davis has been an active public intellectual
contributing numerous media commentaries, interviews and pubic reports on
human rights and constitutional development issues in Hong Kong and beyond.
Special thanks the East West Center at the University of Hawaii for hosting him in
the research phase of this article in the summer of 2014.
1. The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China, Adopted by the National People's Congress on April 4,
1990, Effective July 1, 1997, Articles 45 and 68 [hereinafter Basic Law].
2. Information Office of the State Council, The Practice of the "One Country,
Two Systems" Policy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region [hereinafter
White Paper],June 10, 2014.
3. Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on
Issues Relating to the Selection of the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region by Universal Suffrage and on the Method for Forming the
Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year
2016," [hereinafter NPC Standing Committee Decision], August 31, 2014.
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Declaration 4 and the Hong Kong Basic Law. The White Paper and the
NPC Standing Committee Decision together not only withhold the
promised universal suffrage in Hong Kong but also undermine
critical ingredients of the rule of law that underlay Hong Kong's
distinct legal system. Such abandonment of firm commitments in the
Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Hong Kong Basic Law risk a
serious breach of public trust in China's very inventive "one country,
two systems" model. A broken trust of this nature makes it difficult
for Hong Kong people and the international community to continue
to take these historical commitments at face value. From the liberty
of interpretation Beijing has employed, one would have to conclude
that the words in these historic documents no longer carry the
ordinary meaning and strength of the commitment long relied upon.
In its June 2014 White Paper, Beijing effectively disavows its
international legal obligations in the 1984 Sino-British Joint
Declaration by asserting that the twelve articles of the Joint
Declaration are merely twelve Chinese principles crafted by China
nearly two years before the Joint Declaration in early 1983. 5 This is
followed by a reference in the following paragraph that grounds the
Hong Kong system in the PRC Constitution and the Basic Law, while
omitting the Joint Declaration. 6 The White Paper analysis does not
sufficiently appreciate the substantive distinction between
negotiating principles, as were reportedly crafted even before 1983,
and solemn commitments contained in the final international treaty
reached in 1984. When China's draft negotiating principles were
leaked in 1982, panic ran through Hong Kong. 7 It was only after
4. The 1984 treaty provided for the return of Hong Kong under the "one
country, two systems" model, providing for a high degree of autonomy, democracy,
human rights and the rule of law, all to be included in a basic law. Joint Declaration
of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the Government of the People's Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong,
[hereinafter Sino-British Joint Declaration or Joint Declaration], December 19, 1984.
5. White Paper, supra note 2, part I, para. 2.
6. Id. part II, para. 1. If there were any doubts regarding this intention, Chinese
diplomats in the United Kingdom and their Foreign office colleagues later indicated
that the treaty was "void" or that its purpose had been achieved upon the 1997
handover. L. Gordon Crovitz, "Beijing abrogates 1984 treaty it signed with Britain to
guarantee the city's autonomy," Wall Street Journal,December 15, 2014.
7. Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong: 1841-1997 (London: L. B. Tauris
& Co., 2007) at 219-224.
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reaching the international agreement, which further elaborated and
8
locked in these principles, that confidence was restored.
Along with exclusive authorship, Beijing asserts exclusive
authority.9 Under its claimed "comprehensive jurisdiction" Beijing
claims to be the primary guardian of Hong Kong's rule of law,
emphasizing its sovereign authority to interpret or amend the Basic Law
as it chooses. It casts the local courts in an administrative role
subservient to Beijing's national security concerns. 10 It ominously likens
Beijing's direct control over Hong Kong to the "comprehensive
jurisdiction" it exercises over all local administrative regions on the
mainland." If this is true, one can only wonder why two systems exist.
Such bold assertion of comprehensive power undervalues the
importance of governments being bound by their own laws and
commitments.
On the democratic front, Article 45 of the Basic Law promises
Hong Kong people full universal suffrage to elect their Chief Executive
upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee.
The makeup of that committee and the threshold for nomination have
been the most contentious issues, as Hong Kong people worry Beijing
may seek to vet the candidates to be presented for popular election.
The August 2014 NPC Standing Committee Decision lends credence to
such concern by imposing requirements that effectively allow Beijing
and its supporters to use the nominating process to vet candidates.
This is achieved by requiring candidates for Chief Executive to receive
a majority vote in a highly unrepresentative 1,200-member nominating
committee modeled on the existing Election Committee. 12 Up until
now, Chief Executives have been chosen exclusively by the existing
Election Committee. The NPC Standing Committee Decision would
effectively block candidates from the historically more popular pandemocratic camp. The decision instructs that "the number of members,
composition and formation method" of the Nominating Committee be
the same as that for the Election Committee now used to select the

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 229.
Id. part V, §1, para. 1.
Id.; Id. part V, §3
Id. part V, §1, para. 1.
NPC Standing Committee Decision, para. 11, part II, §1-2.
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Chief Executive.1 3 The Election Committee now has four functional
sectors elected by an elite minority of mostly Beijing supporters who
have traditionally, by huge margins, refused to support candidates
from the pro-democracy camp.
Some have argued this decision leaves room in the future
implementing legislation for expansion of the voter base of the
Nominating Committee, to make it more broadly representative. The
full text of the decision, as discussed below, makes it clear that no such
radical expansion to enable nomination of a member of the democratic
camp is invited. As if the fifty-percent threshold were not enough to
secure its management of the election outcome, Beijing adds a
requirement limiting the number of nominees to two or three. 14 Just in
case a democrat somehow slips by, this limit would presumably allow
a second chance to block such candidate by a majority vote in the
Nominating Committee. If past experience is any indication, Beijing
officials by this stage in an election would have signaled their
candidate preferences. These limitations will surely combine to deny
the voters a free choice of candidates. There is no reason why Hong
Kong democrats would choose such a model-which would afford a
Chief Executive the veneer of democratic legitimacy - over the existing
openly authoritarian model. Pan-democrats have enough votes in the
15
Legislative Council to block the proposal.
Starting with the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
this paper highlights a number of ways that Beijing's seemingly solid
commitments have been eroded by the recent combined actions of the
White Paper and the NPC Standing Committee Decision and why
such erosion is of grave concern. In considering these matters, this
paper argues for the importance, under the "one country, two
systems" model, of being able to take the expressed commitments in
the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law seripusly and at their face
value. Being unable to do so will come at grave cost to both Hong
Kong and China.

13. Id. §1.
14. Id. §2.
15. Pan-democrats, who traditionally win about 55 percent to 60 percent of the
popular vote currently hold about 29 of the 70 legislative seats. The pro-Beijing
establishment camp holds the vast majority of seats because half the seats are held
by narrow functional sectors that greatly favor the establishment camp.
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The following sections will discuss: first, the importance of the
Sino-British Joint Declaration; second, the Basic Law as both a
constitutional document and a solemn commitment to both the rule
of law and important international human rights standards; third, the
recent abandonment of those commitments in the White Paper and
the NPC Standing Committee's Decision on electoral reform; and
fourth, universal suffrage and the importance of the public protest on
its behalf. The challenge in assessing recent reports and decisions is
to make constitutional sense of the "one country, two systems" model
as applied in Hong Kong under the Sino-British Joint Declaration and
the Hong Kong Basic Law and their respective texts. As suggested
above, if these texts have offered no limit on the Central
Government's permitted interpretation due to unlimited authority to
interpret and amend in the NPC Standing Committee, then there
would be nothing to assess. The current assessment therefore
assumes these text were intended to be taken at face value with due
regard to the underlying constitutional objectives.
The Sino-British Joint Declaration
The 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration aimed to carry out the
"one country, two systems" policy outlined in Article 31 of the 1982
PRC Constitution. It was the product of several difficult years of
Sino-British negotiations in the early 1980s that followed on the heals
of Deng Xiaoping's famous 1979 statement that Hong Kong investors
should "put their hearts at ease." 16 In the give and take of that
negotiating process, Deng Xiaoping seemingly came to understand
that the preservation of Hong Kong's distinctive capitalist system and
its substantial contribution to China's economic development
depended on a rock solid commitment to the "one country, two
systems" model he envisioned for Hong Kong.17 That model was
clearly designed to protect Hong Kong from the intrusion of the
mainland's socialist system. The mainland system was then in the

16. STEVE TSANG, A MODERN HISTORY OF HONG KONG 215 (I. B. Tauris 2007). At
the same time Deng made it clear that Hong Kong would be handed back to China.
The suggestion that Hong Kong people "should put their hearts at ease" became a
general theme emphasized frequently in the early transition period so as to
encourage wider Hong Kong acceptance.
17. Id. at 215-225.
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early stages of reform following the chaos of the 1960s and 1970s.18
The Chinese aim was for Hong Kong to be returned to China in a way
that would preserve prosperity and social order and enable the
industrious Hong Kong people to contribute to China's modem
economic development. 19 Chinese hopes were, undoubtedly, that
this respectful arms-length approach would engender Hong Kong
loyalty as well. To work effectively, the model had to win the
confidence of the Hong Kong people. The liberal, free-spirited,
capitalistic Hong Kong population was not going to be reassured by
mere policy promises from a regime many of them justifiably
distrusted, and from which their family members may have fled.
Similarly, the international acceptance needed for foreign governments
and enterprises to treat Hong Kong as a distinct entity in their financial
and commercial dealings would require more than mere policy
statements.
The problem of this confidence gap ultimately arrived at the
solution of embedding the "one country, two systems" model in an
international treaty which was agreed and signed in late 1984.20 The
Sino-British Joint Declaration was appropriately registered as a treaty
with the United Nations. 21 It was presented to the Hong Kong people
with repeated assurances that they should put their hearts at ease,
that these were solemn commitments. 22 It was taken to the capitals of
the world with the same assurances. Most importantly, it required in
Article 7 and 8 that all the articles in the Joint Declaration and its
Annexes were equally binding on both parties and stipulated that its
content, in both the main text and Annex I, was to be included in the
Hong Kong Basic Law. 23 In this commitment, the Hong Kong Basic
Law became a product of the Joint Declaration, its content the subject
of solemn international treaty obligations. It was understood that
18. Id. at 220.
19. Id. at 225 (The idea of a Joint Declaration of international treaty status with a
list of solid guarantees came to be understood in the complex learning process of the
Sino-British negotiations as the way to do this.).
20. Id.
21. See The Sino-British Joint Declaration [hereinafter Joint Declaration], ChinaEng, May 27, 1985, available at http://www.cmab.gov.hk/en/issues/joint2.htm.
22. See generally, MICHAEL C. DAVIS, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFRONTATION IN HONG

KONG (Macmillan Press 1990).
23. Joint Declaration, para. 3, §12.
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winning the hearts and minds of the Hong Kong people and the
world would require no less.
This treaty sought to implement the "one country, two systems"
formula and the policy of Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong. It
guaranteed that Hong Kong would have a "high degree of autonomy,
except inforeign and defense affairs." 24 Flesh was put on the bones
of these skeletal promises in both the Joint Declaration text and in
Annex I thereto. Explicit promises of democracy, human rights and
the rule of law were elaborated sufficiently as to leave little doubt as
to the fundamental commitment to Hong Kong's distinctive status.
Regarding democracy, it was explicitly provided that the future Chief
Executive was to be chosen by "elections or consultations to be held
25
locally" and the future legislature was to be chosen "by elections."
Even this juxtaposition of words makes clear that elections and
consultations are not the same thing.
The treaty left little ambiguity as to the nature of the human rights
26
to be protected, specifying a list of approximately sixteen basic rights.
The list was most noteworthy for its liberal character, with fully half of
the rights being those generally categorized as freedom of speech,
27
including press freedom, labor rights, academic research, and so on.
Not stopping there Annex I, Article XIII requires continued application
of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR) as applied to Hong Kong. 28 The ICCPR would ultimately be
the source for the text of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, and
that text would effectively be incorporated into the Hong Kong Basic
Law through Basic Law Article 39, as applied frequently in the posthandover Hong Kong courts.
As measured by public opinion in Hong Kong, perhaps the most
important ingredient of this edifice is the guarantee to maintain Hong
Kong's existing common law legal system and its associated rule of
law.29 The Joint Declaration provided that the existing laws,
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. para. 3, §2.
Id. para. 3, § 4; Id. Annex I, para. I.
Id. para. 3, §5.
Id.
Id. Annex I, §XIII.
Id. para. 3, §3 and Annex I, §XIII.
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including the common law, rules of equity, local ordinances and
customary law were to be maintained. 30 The courts were to be
independent and final, with the highest court of final appeal in Hong
Kong. 31 Hong Kong people were to be allowed to challenge, in the
courts, the acts of public officials for violating the Basic Law. 32 All
these commitments were likewise stipulated for inclusion in the
33
future Basic Law.
These various requirements in the Joint Declaration combined to
lay a foundation for a robust commitment to constitutionalism, which
has served Hong Kong well. Hong Kong courts, after the handover,
quickly came to understand that the supremacy of the Basic Law
under this model justified the exercise of that most important power
34
of modern constitutional practice, constitutional judicial review.
Constitutional judicial review gives the courts the power to
determine the constitutionality of official acts and has generally
proven worldwide to be the best foundation for guarding the rule of
law and human rights under a constitution. The common law rule of
law tradition assures that the courts are committed to exercise this
power in a fair and independent manner without favor.
Both Hong Kong people and the world at large took the solemn
commitments of this international agreement quite seriously. This
became evident in the reduced flow of emigrants out of Hong Kong
and in public opinion more generally. 35 Given the situation in China
in prior years, it is doubtful that Hong Kong people would have been
encouraged to put their hearts at ease merely based on some vague
promises from Beijing without the solid foundation laid by the
agreement. At the time Beijing's track record more generally during
the previous two decades, which included the Cultural Revolution,
hardly inspired confidence in its commitment to human rights and
the rule of law. Even today China has yet to achieve this level of
constitutional development. Its specific record in dealing with
designated autonomous areas on the mainland such as Tibet and
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. Annex I, §II.
Id. Annex I, §111.
Id. Annex I, §XIII.
Id. para. 3, §12.
Ng Ka Ling v. Directorof Immigration,[1999] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 315,318-319 (C.F.A.)
See generally, TSANG, supra note 7, at 215-225.
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Uyghur areas inspires even less confidence. 36 The. importance of
foreign governments taking these treaty commitments seriously no
doubt inspired the many trips by Beijing officials to solicit foreign
support for the "one country, two systems" model. This foreign
support no doubt further inspired Hong Kong people's confidence in
37
the model.
The guarantees in the Joint Declaration further aimed to equip
Hong Kong to uphold its obligations under the "one country, two
systems" model to contribute to China's economic development and
modernization. With a high degree of autonomy and the tools to
govern itself, the Chinese and British negotiators seemingly
anticipated that Hong Kong would be in a position to take
responsibility for its half of the "one country, two system" vision. The
agreement clearly did not envision the Central Government simply
occupying and subordinating Hong Kong, as was the case under
colonial rule. The challenge in the intervening years, as the Basic Law
was drafted and implemented, has been to enable Hong Kong to
move forward as a successful contributor to China's modem
development. As one of the world's leading educational, financial,
commercial, and cultural centers, it has surely done so. As is often
true with autonomy regimes, the flip of this challenge is to contain
the natural urge of the Central Government to excessively intrude
upon the autonomous exercise of such responsibility. In such
constitutional vision, the Central Government trusting Hong Kong
and enabling this process would better engender the mutual trust and
pride needed for the model to work. Under such an autonomy
model, distrust and frequent intervention by the more powerful
center will tend to produce the opposite effect.
The Hong Kong Basic Law
The Basic Law, for the most part, faithfully includes the
stipulated contents of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, though there
are shortcomings in provisions effecting the independence and

36. China's national minority autonomy policies have aimed chiefly at asserting
greater central control. See generally, Michael C. Davis, "Tibet and China's National
Minority Policies," Orbis (Summer, 2012), Vol. 56, No. 3, 429-446.
37. See generally, TSANG, supra note 7.
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finality of the courts and the election and powers of the legislature. 38
These shortcomings in many ways predict the current impasse.
Beijing effectively included in the Basic Law itself the NPC Standing
Committee's full power to interpret or amend the Basic Law as it
chooses. 39 Except for dragging its feet on democratic development, it
has until very recently generally been careful and restrained itself
40
from exercising such power.
With the ultimate power to interpret the Basic Law resting with
the NPC Standing Committee, advised by a Basic Law Committee,
there has been some concern regarding maintaining the independence
and finality of the courts. China has respected the finality of decisions
of the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) in the strict sense, in that final
judgments are final and binding as to the parties. 41 Some concern
arose very early on when Beijing allowed the government, absent any
authorizing language in the Basic Law, to run around the CFA by
going directly to the NPC Standing Committee to overturn the law of
the case in the famous 1999 right of abode case. 42 It is of concern in a
common law system that the courts have been required to treat all
NPC Standing Committee decisions as binding on even the CFA,
especially given that the mainland practice of interpretation often
slips into amendment. Permitting the Hong Kong Government to go
directly to the NPC Standing Committee and effectively preempt the

38. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 158, 45 and 68; Id. Annexes I and II.
39. Id. art. 158 and 159.
40. In the first decade after the handover it had only issued one interpretation of
the Basic Law in a matter arising out of a court case, that being the Ng Ka Ling case.
See Ng Ka Ling, supra note 27.
41. While overturning the CFA's ruling as to the law of the case in Ng Ka Ling,
the NPC Standing Committee did not purport to overturn the final judgment as to
the parties of the case. Id.; See Generally The Interpretation of Articles 22(4) and
24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China (promulgated by by STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S
CONG., June 26, 1999) (1999) (China) [hereinafter Interpretation].
42. Id.; The CFA earlier upheld under Article 24 of the Basic Law the right of
abode in Hong Kong of certain children of Hong Kong residents. Finding the matter
within Hong Kong autonomy the CFA had refused to refer the matter to the NPC
Standing Committee, as it must do for certain matters of central authority and those
involving local-central relations under Article 158. The Hong Kong Government
then referred the matter on its own and got the substantive ruling as to the law
overturned. See Ng Ka Ling, supranote 27.
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CFA's interpretation of the Basic Law raises further rule of law
concerns. This power of the Government to directly refer a matter
may raise an implicit threat to do so in contentious cases where the
Government is seeking referral. Under the rule of law, nobody,
including the government, should be above the law. That the process
by which the Basic Law Committee is consulted is entirely opaque
raises additional concern in an open rule-of-law-based society. The
fact that the NPC Standing Committee and the Hong Kong
Government have generally exercised a degree of restraint in
resorting to such extraordinary measures, at least up until the White
Paper was issued, has muted public concern.
The largest shortcoming in the Basic Law has been with respect
to elections. In the Joint Declaration's articulated dichotomy between
elections and consultations, noted above, the Chief Executive's
selection to date by a narrowly representative Election Committee
would clearly fall under the category of consultations. 43 Based on the
same distinction, the promise that the legislature will be chosen by
elections has not been fulfilled, as nearly half of the seats in the
Legislative Council are chosen by narrow functional constituencies,
where corporate voters prevail. 44 To Beijing's credit, for both chief
executive and legislative elections, the Basic Law in Articles 45 and 68
45
respectively commits to the "ultimate aim" of "universal suffrage."
That commitment has given rise to the current controversy.
Universal suffrage, on its face, should be relatively clear. The
term generally implies free and fair elections with the right to vote
and run for office. Article 39 of the Basic Law provides that any
restrictions on rights and freedoms of Hong Kong residents shall not
violate the ICCPR as applied in Hong Kong.46 ICCPR Article 25
provides:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without the distinctions mentioned in Article 2
(regarding discrimination) and without unreasonable
restrictions: ... (b) to vote and to be elected at genuine
periodic elections which shall be by universal and
43. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 45 and Annex I.
44. Id. art. 45, 68, Annexes I and II.
45. Id. art. 45 and 68.
46. Id. art. 39.
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equal suffrage ...guaranteeing the free expression of

47
the will of the voters.
The General Comment on Article 25 issued by the ICCPR Human
Rights Committee (HRC) emphasizes that universal suffrage should
provide the voters a genuine choice in a free and fair election.48 The
prohibited distinctions mentioned in the article bar discrimination,
among other things, for political opinion.
The Hong Kong Government has continually, rather shamefully,
tried to avail itself of a forty-year-old British colonial reservation to
the electoral provisions in the ICCPR.49 That reservation sought to
exclude any requirement that the executive and legislative councils
in the colonial government be elected. 50 Since Hong Kong was then
under colonial rule, the reservation does not include the post-colonial
office of the Chief Executive. 51 Even as to the Legislative Council, the
ICCPR HRC has rejected continued application of such colonial
reservation.5 2 The HRC is of the view that once colonialism ends and
Hong Kong is committed to universal suffrage, then the reservation
no longer applies.53 Elections should then conform to the ICCPR
requirements for universal and equal suffrage. The Hong Kong
failure in this regard was again before the HRC in October 2014 under
the follow-up procedure of the HRC regarding Hong Kong's third
ICCPR report.54 In any further reports the HRC will no doubt take a
47. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 25.
48. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25
Participationin PublicAffairs and the Right to Vote, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7, August
27, 1996, availableat http://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fc22.html.
49. Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China,
Third Report in Light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (2010)
available at http:/ /www.legco.gov.hk/yrlO-11/english/panels/ca/papers/cacb22663-e.pdf, para. 25.1-25.9 (2010).
50. Id.
51. There was no office of chief executive prior to the handover. Id.
52. As noted in the Third Report, such rejection has been included in the HRC
Concluding Observations to the three periodic reports filed under the ICCPR by the
Hong Kong Government. Id.
53. Id.
54. See generallyJoyce Ng, Human Rights Committee to Discuss Universal Suffrage in
Hong Kong, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Sept. 10, 2014, 02.18 PM),
http:/ /www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/ article/1588892/un-committee-lookuniversal-suffrage-hong-kong.
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dim view of the recent NPC Standing Committee Decision, though it
seems the Government may take little note of the HRC's concern.
Required international standards under the Basic Law leave little
ambiguity regarding the substance of the promised universal
suffrage. As already noted, the commitment to "universal suffrage"
alone, in its ordinary meaning, promises free and fair elections that
allow the voters a "free choice of candidates." 55 The Basic Law offers
more assurances in this regard. Basic Law Article 26 guarantees
Hong Kong residents "the right to vote and the right to stand for
election in accordance with law." 56 Of course, such law includes
57
guarantees of freedom of expression and equality in the Basic Law.
The NPC Standing Committee has continually dragged its feet
on substantial democratic reform in Hong Kong, referencing the Basic
Law "principle of gradual and orderly progress" based on the "actual
situation" specified for the Chief Executive in Article 45 and the
Legislative Council in Article 68.58 In a 2004 binding decision, the
NPC Standing Committee seemed to substantially amend the process
for electoral reform by imposing a five-step process requiring that the
Hong Kong Government first submit to the NPC Standing Committee
for approval a report indicating that there is a need to change the
method of electing either the Chief Executive or the Legislative
Council.59 Though the Basic Law specifies a requirement of NPC
Standing Committee approval for changing the method for electing
the Chief Executive, it only requires reporting "for the record" as
regards the Legislative Council.60 Now, under this directive Beijing's
approval is required in advance for either reform. The foot-dragging
approach and continuous interference in this debate has surely
undermined confidence in the promised high degree of autonomy
and democratic development.

55. Id. para. 15.
56. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 26.
57. Id. art. 25 and 27.
58. See id. art. 45 and 68.
59. The Interpretation of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic
of China (promulgated by by STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG., Apr. 6, 2004),
§3 (2004) (China).
60. Basic Law, supranote 1, Annexes and II.

Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.

[Vol. 38:2

In a 2007 decision denying substantial democratic reform
regarding the ratio of functional seats to directly elected seats for the
then upcoming Legislative Council election, Beijing further ruled that
the ultimate aim of "universal suffrage" may be allowed for the 2017
election for Chief Executive and, even further, if that election is by
universal suffrage, the next election in 2020 for the Legislative
Council may be by universal suffrage. 61 While this would also require
the above-noted step of initial approval that there is a need for
change, it raised hopes among a very skeptical public.
The 2007 ruling gave rise to the debate regarding the meaning of
universal suffrage for the CE election. Basic Law Article 45 provides,
"[t]he ultimate aim is selection of the Chief Executive by universal
suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating
committee in accordance with democratic procedures." 62 After years
of Beijing delaying the democratic reform process under the
requirement of "gradual and orderly progress" based on the "actual
situation" Hong Kong people have acquired a great deal of suspicion
regarding Beijing's democratic promises.
In its 2007 decision, the NPC Standing Committee indicated,
through suggestive language, that the nominating committee for
universal suffrage "may be formed with reference" to the current
1200-member Election Committee. 63 That committee, with its
membership elected by approximately 250,000 elite mostly proestablishment voters, has heavily favored pro-Beijing candidates. 64
Historically, it has barely been able to amass sufficient votes to even
nominate pro-democracy candidates under a 1/8 threshold for
nomination. Democrats have not stood a chance in the actual election

61. Decision Relating to the Method for Selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong
Kong Special Administrative Region and for Forming the Legislative Council of the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2012 and on Issues Relating to
Universal Suffrage (promulgated by STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CoNG., Aug. 31,
2014), [hereinafter 2007 NPC Standing Comm. Decision] (2014) (China), para. 9.
62. Basic Law, supra note 1, art. 45.
63. 2007 NPC Standing Comm. Decision, supra note 54, para. 4.
64. See Hong Kong 2020, Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for
Forming the Legislative Council in 2016, (Mar. 20, 2014) available at https://
hongkong2020.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/hk2020s-proposal.pdf.
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before the Election Committee.65 The idea of using the Election
Committee as a model stirred a lot of suspicion that Beijing would
seek to manipulate the makeup of the Nominating Committee to
assure only Beijing's preferred candidates could be nominated.
Given that the nominating process heavily favored candidates from
the pro-establishment camp, this concern seemed justified.6 6 This
distrust has led democrats to support proposals for public or civil
nominations binding on the Nominating Committee as a way to get
around Beijing's anticipated manipulation of the nominating
process. 67 Beijing attacked these proposals as violating the Basic Law
even while their own proposals appeared to more profoundly violate
the Basic law requirements for universal suffrage and full access to
the electoral process in compliance with human rights standards.
The White Paper, the Hong Kong Reports and the NPC
Standing Committee Decision
These concerns all came to a head in 2014 as the debate over the
planned universal suffrage for the 2017 Chief Executive election
ensued. This debate got off to a raucous start as democracy groups
anticipated further foot dragging and manipulation of the official
public consultation, which stretched across the first five months of
the year. Early on, the pro-democracy group, Occupy Central for
Love and Peace, riveted public attention by promising a civil
disobedience campaign if the electoral model did not meet
international standards. Occupy Central organized several public
deliberation sessions and ultimately a civil referendum, which
attracted nearly 800,000 voters, to capture public opinion.68 This
turnout was aided by public contempt for the White Paper, which
65. See Michael C. Davis, Hongkong UmbrellaMovement and Beijing's Failureto Honor
the Basic Law, E-International Relations (Oct. 29, 2014), available at http://www.eir.info/2014/10/29/the-umbrella-movement-and-beijings-failure-to-respect-thehong-kong-basic-law/.
66. Id.
67. The most prominent pan-democratic proposal was put forth by the Alliance
for True Democracy, made up by the pan-democratic members of the Legislative
Council. Their proposal involved both civil and party nominations. See Alliance for
True Democracy, Composition of the Nominating Committee, APPLE DAILY (Jan. 9, 2014),
http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20140109/18585320.
68. Davis, supra note 65.
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was conveniently released just before the civil referendum. Soon
after, the referendum a half-million marchers showed up for the
annual July 1st march for democracy. The pro-Beijing camp even
organized an "anti-Occupy" march.
While public protests and a civil referendum took place on the
streets, Beijing hit Hong Kong with the unexpected White Paper on
"one country, two systems." In the White Paper, Beijing's claims of
ultimate authority were firmly chiseled in stone. The long advanced
mantra of Hong Kong people putting their hearts at ease was
replaced with an assertion that Beijing is the boss. As noted above,
the twelve articles of the Sino-British Joint Declaration were now
characterized as twelve preexisting Chinese principles that "come
solely from the authorization of the Central leadership," dismissing
the international legal stature of these commitments. 69 With this
move Beijing emphasized its full authority to interpret or amend the
Basic Law that it would then use to deny Hong Kong universal
suffrage.
In the White Paper, the above views, taking Hong Kong's high
degree of autonomy seriously, were condemned as a "confused or
lopsided view." 70 Beijing emphasized that a "high degree of
autonomy" is not "full autonomy." 71 Beijing's "comprehensive
jurisdiction" over Hong Kong is said to be similar to its direct control
over other local administrative regions. 72 This is hardly a comforting
prospect given the troubled history of that control over local
autonomous regions in Tibet and Xinjiang. The NPC Standing
Committee is credited with "comprehensive jurisdiction" and the
power of "supervision" over local legislation. 73 Beijing now identifies
the NPC Standing Committee as the guardian of Hong Kong's rule of
law. 74 Judges are required to be patriots and are described as
administrative or governing officials charged with upholding
national security. 75
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

White Paper, supra note 2, part. I, para. 3.
Id. pt. V, para. 1.
Id. pt V, §1.
Id.
Id. pt. II, §1, para. 1.
Id. pt. V, §2, para. 2.
Id. pt. V, §3.
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The White Paper largely confined its comments on democratic
reform to an assertion that the above-noted rather unrepresentative
Election Committee "is an expression of equal representation and
broad representativeness." 76 It further specified that the Chief
Executive must be a person "who loves the country and loves Hong
Kong." 77 Most Hong Kong residents view this as code for excluding
the pan-democratic politicians who have led Hong Kong's struggle
for democracy.
The local democratic reform process was officially initiated
under two Hong Kong government reports. These included a report
on the consultative process over electoral reform that stretched across
the first five months of 2014 and the report by the Hong Kong Chief
Executive to the NPC Standing Committee on the need for reform. 78
These reports offered a rather strained view of Hong Kong people's
opinions on reform that largely tracked the outcome Beijing had
advocated and would later endorse.
Despite huge public
demonstrations and nearly 800,000 people in a civil referendum
endorsing genuine democracy in compliance with international
standards and favoring a form of civil and party nominations, a very
79
different picture emerged from these reports.
The consultative report, as summarized in the Chief Executive's
report, describes Hong Kong views as follows (condensed and
summarized):
1) "mainstream opinion" favors exclusive power to nominate
candidates in the Nominating Committee." (Largely ignoring
"divergent view")
2) "community generally agrees that the CE should be a person

76. Id. pt. III, para. 4.
77. Id. pt. V, §4, para. 3.
78. See generally Hong Kong Government, Report on the PublicConsultation on the
Methods of Selecting the Chief Executive in 2017 and for Forming the Legislative Council in
2016, (July 2014) available at http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/ template/en/
doc/report/consultationreport.pdf. See also Hong Kong Government, Report by the
Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress on whether there is a need to amend the methods for
selecting the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2017 and
forforming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in 2016
(July 2014) availableat http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/liberal/related.html.
79. Davis, supra note 65.
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who loves the Country and loves Hong Kong." (Does this exclude
pan-democrats?)
3) "relatively more views" agree the composition of the
Nominating Committee should be like the Election Committee.
(The latter being largely a pro-Beijing body)
4) "considerable views" favor increasing the seats on the
Nominating Committee with little attention to the electoral base.
5) "quite a number of views" suggest that candidates must obtain
the support of a "certain proportion" of the Nominating
Committee to show "cross-sector support" in the committee. (Does
a certain proportion mean 50 percent?)
6) there are "two major views" on the number of candidates with
one limiting it to two or three "to ensure the solemnity of the
election." (The other not solemn?)
7) "a number of groups and members of the public "expressed
divergent views." (No mention of 800,000 voters doing so.)
8) people "generally agreed" to ignore reform of the Legislative
Council. (This despite many years of public clamor for full direct
80
elections?)
These reports have been widely condemned for their failure to
convey recognizable Hong Kong public opinion. Academics later
studied the consultative report and noted that 90-plus percent of
consultation submissions were block submissions from the progovernment camp. 81 Subsequent Hong Kong reports published in
January 2015 reporting on the huge "occupy" protests - now called
the "umbrella movement" - and launching the second round
consultation on democratic reform made no attempt to correct the
8 2
earlier misrepresentations or seriously address public concerns.
80. Id. at 8-11.
81. Calvin Liu, Brian Yap and Joyce Ng,Consultation dominated by block responses,
SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Aug. 18, 2014, 10:40 AM), available at http://www.
scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1575617/consultation-dominated-blocresponses.
81. See Hong Kong Government, Report on the Recent Community and Political
Situation (January 2015) available at http://www.2017.gov.hk/filemanager/template
/en/doc/rcpsjreport/rcpsreport.pdf. See also Hong Kong Government, 2017 Seize
the Opportunity,Method for Selecting the ChiefExecutive by Universal Suffrage, (anuary
2015) at http://www.2017.gov.hk/en/home/.
82. Id.
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The NPC Standing Committee, seemingly in lockstep,
wholeheartedly embraced the Hong Kong Chief Executive's report
without questioning its factual basis.8 3 Beijing and Hong Kong
officials had already claimed there were no international standards
for universal suffrage or that they are not applicable to Hong Kong. 84
Seizing the unfettered authority it had earlier claimed in the White
Paper, Beijing interpreted the Basic Law's solemn commitment to
universal suffrage in a way nobody but Beijing and its supporters
would recognize. As long predicted, the NPC Standing Committee
decision embraced the Chief Executive's request for change, but
imposed severe limits. Pan-democratic legislators have promised to
veto any Government bill based on these limitations.8 5 With just over
one-third of the seats pan-democratic legislators have sufficient votes
to block the bill in the Legislative Council where a two-thirds vote is
86
required for passage of this quasi-constitutional amendment.
By requiring that the Nominating Committee follow the makeup
and formation of the Election Committee, the decision assures an
unrepresentative pro-establishment nominating committee. 87 By
imposing a fifty-percent threshold for nomination in such committee,
the decision guarantees that pan-democrats will have no chance at
nomination.8 8 To ensure this further, the NPC Standing Committee
limits the number of nominees to two or three.8 9 The decision worries
about sovereignty and security and emphasizes the need for the Chief
Executive to be a person "who loves the country and loves Hong
Kong." 90 This is generally viewed as code for excluding democrats.

83. See NPC Standing Committee Decision, supra note 54, para. 5.
84. Li Fei goes so far to accuse democrats of misleading the public in asserting
international standards. Chris Buckley and Michael Forsythe, Beijing Rules Out Open
Elections in Hong Kong, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2014; Regina Ip, The Logic of Beijing's Version
of the 2017 Chief Executive Election," SOUTH CHINA MORNING Posr, Aug. 31, 2014; Tony
Cheung and Joyce Ng, Universal suffragefor the 2017 Election Should be Approved by Beijing
on Wednesday, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, Aug. 26, 2014.
85. Michael C. Davis, Broken Trust, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 4, 2014;
Margaret Ng, Hong Kong's Democracy Dilemma, INTL N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2014.
86. Id.
87. NPC Standing Committee Decision, part II, §1.
88. Id., part II, §2.
89. Id.
90. Id. para. 7.
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The argument over patriotism appears to be a red herring. The Hong
Kong Oaths and Declarations Ordinance requires all prominent
officials, including the Chief Executive, ExCo members, LegCo
members and judges to swear to uphold the Basic Law and "bear
allegiance" to the Hong Kong SAR. 91
China's own interest cannot be well served by imposing such
limitations on elections in Hong Kong. This engenders the strong
opposition to which China objects. Hong Kong people and the world
at large will have no trust in a government formed in such a highhanded manner under the pretense of universal suffrage. In the view
of many democrats the present autocratic system may be better than
legitimating substandard democracy.
Universal Suffrage and Legitimate Public Demands
The above narrative history of the "one country, two systems"
model makes clear that very fundamental commitments have been
breached. While the White Paper is of questionable legal standing,
its account suggests a fundamental change in the "one country, two
systems" formula. The change in tone from "put your hearts at ease"
to Beijing is the boss with "comprehensive jurisdiction" is worrying
enough. On its face, the White Paper poses very specific challenges
to the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the "one country, two
systems" formula it provides. Subordinating Hong Kong courts to
Beijing's preeminent role in guarding the rule of law surely could not
have been contemplated in the Joint Declaration. Effectively
recasting that treaty as mere Beijing principles calls into question the
security of the "one country, two systems" formula in its entirety.
Beijing's direct control over Hong Kong in a fashion similar to other
local administrative areas cannot possibly render the high degree of
autonomy promised. The change in the tone of these commitments
alone should justify wide-scale public concern.
The complete denuding of the commitment to universal suffrage
surely justifies, in the strongest terms, the objections that have been
made by the Hong Kong protesters. Is it possible that universal
suffrage anywhere can properly include elimination of all opposition
candidates from an election and still be recognized as universal

91. Oaths and Declaration Ordinances, Cap 11, part 1 (H.K.).
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suffrage? When the ICCPR HIRC next reviews Hong Kong's response
to its earlier concluding observations, it will surely object strenuously
to this obvious deficiency. With Beijing's explicit orders denying the
promised "universal suffrage" that the Hong Kong Government has
emphasized in its previous reports under the ICCPR, the Hong Kong
Government will be in no position to dodge this bullet. This will surely
leave the Government with little credibility in the pubic eye, a problem
that ensures continuing governance issues. It will also put a stain on
Hong Kong's international reputation and call into question Hong
Kong's autonomy under the "one country, two systems" model.
Due to the complete lack of democratic development, Hong
Kong people are left with no other avenues to voice their objections
except by exercising their free speech right of resistance through
public protest. The heavy-handed tactics of police, using tear gas and
pepper spray to contain peaceful protest, no doubt swelled the
number of protesters that ultimately joined the "umbrella moment"
that occupied the streets for 79 days from late September until the
sights were cleared in December. Was such civil disobedience
justified? Given this sorry history of Beijing interference in Hong
Kong's autonomy and the duplicity of the local Hong Kong
government, there is certainly a reasonable case.
Civil disobedience is generally considered more justified when
there is a lack of democracy, leaving no other channels to influence
government policy. The Beijing Government, through systematic
interference and the denial of democratic reform, has caused more
and more public protest to challenge unpopular government policy.
This has encouraged a cycle of crisis and protest in Hong Kong. The
more heavy-handed and undemocratic the government is, the more
people protest, and the more they protest, the more heavy handed the
government response.
In this vicious cycle, the governments at both levels have allowed
their commitment to the shared project of "one country, two systems"
to erode slowly over the years, causing more and more confrontation
in the society. Popular protests have generally had a correlation with
Central Government interference to advance its preferences. This has
been evident in several massive protests over the years, especially
those against Government efforts to enact Beijing-inspired national
security and secrecy laws and again in response to efforts to initiate
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patriotic education. 92 The latest round of interference to redefine and
deny universal suffrage has clearly put Hong Kong's promised high
degree of autonomy at risk and, along with it, the rule of law and
many core values identified with Hong Kong.
The central point of Deng Xiaoping's vision, as it ultimately came
to fruition in the Sino-British Joint Declaration, appeared to be respect
93
for each distinct system along with mutual trust and sharing.
Constantly batting down Hong Kong demands to fulfill the solemn
commitments in the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law hardly
engenders trust. A local government that is made continuously
subservient to the Central Government can hardly fulfill its duty to
guard Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy in a responsible way.
Both the executive and legislative branches have largely been coopted
to Beijing's influence or control, as have the many favored Hong
Kong representatives appointed to mainland consultative
committees and legislative bodies. For leading officials to only
represent and convey Beijing's wishes can hardly encourage
confidence that Hong Kong interest and concerns are represented. If
we were to look for where to place blame for public anxiety and
dissent, the answer is clear.
Hong Kong is at a juncture where serious leaders should be
looking for ways to undo this sorry record and carry out the letter
and spirit of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Hong Kong
people have long been prepared to work with China on carrying out
the vision of the "one country, two systems" model. Serious
democratic development to afford them the avenue to uphold their
end of the bargain would go a long way toward bringing the current
sense of crisis to an end. Instead of lecturing Hong Kong people on
their alleged mistakes in demanding fulfillment of the commitments
made and accusing Hong Kong youth of being "triads" for their
tactics of protest there is a need for China's anointed government
officials to offer an honest path forward. 94 The sorry path of

92. Michael C. Davis, The Basic Law and Democratizationin Hong Kong, Loy. INT'L
L. REv., 165, 180 (2006).
93. Such conclusion can seemingly be garnered from the careful negotiating
process over the Joint Declaration discussed above. See TsANG, supra note 7, at 215-225.

94. Peter So, Pro-Beijing Activist Compares Organizers of Student Strikes to 'Triad
Gangs,' SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 9, 2014.
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misinterpretation and bullying that has occurred to date is clearly
viewed with suspicion by many Hong Kong people.
A change in policy to fully meet the commitments in the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law, as those commitments are commonly
understood, is badly needed. Allowing a thriving Hong Kong, with
satisfied self-governing residents, to emerge will surely diminish
confrontation and engender the patriotism that China has so
frequently sought. If London, with a foreign language and great
distance, can engender such respect, surely Beijing can as well. The
first step is for leading officials in Hong Kong and Beijing to stop
blaming Hong Kong people and look in the mirror. Then it will
become clear that the best way to rule Hong Kong is in accordance
with the genuine democratic commitments made, as reflected in the
plain meaning of the relevant text. The deficient democracy now on
the table clearly does not meet that standard.
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